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______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Plaintiff-Appellant Raymond Bronowicz (“Appellant” 
or “Bronowicz”) is a former Pennsylvania state inmate and 
probationer.  As a probationer, Bronowicz was repeatedly 
charged with probation violations and was ultimately 
sentenced to additional incarceration.  Bronowicz 
successfully appealed that prison sentence in state court and 
then filed the present action seeking, inter alia, damages for 
his wrongful incarceration under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
Bronowicz appeals from the District Court’s dismissal of his 
claims as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). 
 This appeal raises a discrete issue involving claims for 
damages for unlawful incarceration brought under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983.  We must decide whether an order from the Superior 
Court of Pennsylvania vacating a sentence imposed by a court 
of common pleas constitutes a favorable termination of the 
proceedings against a plaintiff within the meaning of Heck v. 
Humphrey—notwithstanding the fact that the order failed 
expressly to address the inmate’s specific legal challenges to 
the sentence.  For the reasons that follow, we hold that such 
an order constitutes a favorable termination of the 
proceedings against the plaintiff and that any § 1983 claims 
stemming from the invalidated sentence are not barred by 
Heck.  Accordingly, we will affirm in part and reverse in part 
the District Court’s order dismissing Appellant’s claims. 
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I.  Facts1 
 Bronowicz’s § 1983 claims arise from a complicated 
series of sentencing and probation revocation proceedings 
that allegedly had the cumulative effect of unlawfully 
imposing on Bronowicz additional penalties for criminal 
judgments that had already been satisfied.  Because the 
sequence of events that culminated in his wrongful 
incarceration is complex, we must discuss the initial criminal 
charges and the events of each hearing in detail.   
A. Initial Charges and Sentencing 
 On July 5, 2000, Bronowicz was charged with several 
criminal violations of Pennsylvania law ranging from 
terroristic threats to driving under the influence.2  Bronowicz 
entered a negotiated plea and appeared before the Allegheny 
                                                          
 1 Because Bronowicz appeals from the grant of a 
motion to dismiss, we accept all his factual allegations as true 
and construe the complaint in the light most favorable to him.  
See Powell v. Weiss, 757 F.3d 338, 341 (3d Cir. 2014).   
 2 Specifically, on July 5, 2000, Bronowicz was charged 
by information with violations of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 
2702(a)(3), aggravated assault, one count; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2703.1, aggravated harassment by prisoner, one count; 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706(a)(1), terroristic threats, two counts; 75 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 3731(a)(1), driving under the influence of 
alcohol (“DUI”), one count; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5104, 
resisting arrest, one count; 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2701(a)(1), 
simple assault, three counts; and 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5503, 
disorderly conduct, one count. 
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County Court of Common Pleas (the “Court of Common 
Pleas”) for sentencing on June 6, 2001.  Bronowicz was 
sentenced as follows: 
• Count One, aggravated assault, withdrawn per 
the plea agreement 
• Count Two, aggravated harassment by a 
prisoner, withdrawn per the plea agreement 
• Count Three, terroristic threats, no further 
penalty3 
• Count Four, terroristic threats, five to ten 
months’ incarceration, effective June 6, 2001, with 
credit for time served, and five years’ probation, also 
effective June 6, 2001 
• Count Five, DUI, ninety to one hundred eighty 
days’ incarceration, effective June 6, 2001, with credit 
for time served, and five years’ probation, also 
effective June 6, 2001, both to run concurrently with 
the sentence for Count Four 
• Count Six, resisting arrest, no further penalty 
• Count Seven, simple assault, no further penalty 
                                                          
 3 An assessment of “no further penalty” indicates that 
no additional incarceration, probation, or fines will be 
imposed for that count.  
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• Count Eight, simple assault, two years’ 
probation, to run concurrently with the sentences for 
Counts Four and Nine 
• Count Nine, simple assault, two years’ 
probation, to run concurrently with the sentences for 
Counts Four and Eight 
• Count Ten, disorderly conduct, no further 
penalty 
 Thus Bronowicz was sentenced to further 
imprisonment and /or probation for only Counts Four, Five, 
Eight and Nine.  Counts One and Two were withdrawn per 
the plea agreement, and Bronowicz was assessed “no further 
penalty” for Counts Three, Six, Seven, and Ten—indicating 
that Bronowicz had fully served his sentence for these counts 
as of that hearing.  With credit for time served, he was 
released from incarceration on June 6 and began serving a 
term of probation.  
B. First Revocation Proceeding 
 On July 21, 2005, Bronowicz appeared before the 
Court of Common Pleas for probation violations.  The court 
revoked Bronowicz’s probation and re-sentenced him for two 
counts.  However, because at least one of the counts was 
numbered differently than in the original information, there 
was confusion as to which counts were available for re-
sentencing.4  Bronowicz was sentenced to further 
                                                          
 4 Bronowicz alleges that Defendant Probation Officers 
Jeffrey Cima and Karen Ollis (“Defendant Probation 
Officers”) and /or the District Attorney intentionally 
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incarceration and additional probation for “Count One,” DUI 
(which appeared as Count Five in the original information) 
and an additional probationary period for Count Three, 
terroristic threats.  Bronowicz alleges that these sentences 
were imposed illegally because: (1) the additional sentence 
imposed for the DUI count exceeded the statutory maximum 
penalty of five years,5 and (2) the court had no authority to 
impose an additional sentence for Count Three since no 
further penalty was assessed initially.6 
 Bronowicz was re-incarcerated and then granted house 
arrest on December 20, 2005. 
                                                                                                                                  
rearranged the charges so that it appeared he could be 
resentenced for counts where initially no further penalty was 
assessed. 
 5 Bronowicz pleaded guilty to DUI, misdemeanor in 
the first degree, which carries a maximum penalty of five 
years’ imprisonment.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1104.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, a probationary sentence “may not exceed 
the maximum term for which the defendant could be 
confined.”  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9754(a).  Bronowicz was 
sentenced to the maximum penalty of five years at his initial 
sentencing.  Thus, he argues, any additional time imposed 
based on this count exceeded the maximum penalty permitted 
under law.  
 6 Following a probation violation, a trial court lacks 
authority to resentence a defendant on a conviction for which 
he had originally been sentenced to “no further penalty.”  See 
Commonwealth v. Williams, 997 A.2d 1205, 1208-09 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2010).    
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C. Second Revocation Proceeding 
 In July 2008, Bronowicz was arrested on other 
charges, and a bench warrant issued for alleged violations of 
probation.  Bronowicz was again re-incarcerated.7  On July 
20, 2010, Bronowicz appeared at a second probation 
revocation hearing.  The court “continued” Bronowicz’s 
probation for Count Four, terroristic threats—though there 
was no term of probation to “continue” for this count, as 
Bronowicz’s five-year term of probation had expired on June 
5, 2006.   App. 275.  The court also sentenced Bronowicz to 
additional imprisonment for Count Five, DUI (now correctly 
numbered as in the original information), and with credit for 
time served, he was released from incarceration and “paroled 
forthwith” on July 27, 2010.  App. 269.  Bronowicz alleges 
that the “[c]ourt concluded its interest in the DUI charge” at 
that time, as he had fully served his sentence for this count.  
App. 269-70. 
                                                          
 7 Bronowicz alleges that because several of the 
sentences imposed in July 2005 were illegal, see supra lines 
126-30, his “legal” probationary period expired in June 2008.  
App. 269.  Accordingly, Bronowicz argues that he was no 
longer on probation when he was arrested for alleged 
probation violations in July 2008, making any sentence 
imposed illegal. 
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D. Third Revocation Proceeding 
 In November 2010, another bench warrant issued for 
further probation violations,8 and Bronowicz was again re-
incarcerated.  Bronowicz’s next revocation proceeding was 
scheduled for January 19, 2011 (the “January 2011 
proceeding”).  The day before the hearing, Bronowicz’s 
lawyer told him that he would not be present for the hearing 
and informed Bronowicz that the probation office wanted to 
offer him a deal.  Bronowicz adamantly objected to any plea 
deal because he believed his probationary term had expired 
before his arrest. 
 The next day Probation Officer Karen Ollis spoke with 
Bronowicz while he was waiting to be called for his hearing.  
                                                          
 8  Bronowicz alleges that another probation officer told 
him that he had been released from his probationary sentence 
when he reported to the probation office after his release from 
custody in July 2010.  Nevertheless, Defendant Probation 
Officer Cima requested in November 2010 that Bronowicz 
report to the probation office.  When Bronowicz reported to 
the office, Officer Cima handcuffed Bronowicz for “smoking 
crack,” and contacted Defendant Probation Officer Ollis who 
recommended incarceration.  App. 270-71.  Bronowicz 
maintains that he was never tested for drugs and that the 
Defendant Probation Officers never provided him with any 
test results evidencing drug use.  Bronowicz reminded them 
that he was no longer on probation, but he was “ignored.”  
App. 271.  The November 2010 bench warrant was issued for 
this alleged probation violation.  Bronowicz avers in the 
Complaint that this entire episode was an illegal search and 
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.  
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Officer Ollis told Bronowicz that she had reached an 
agreement with Bronowicz’s attorney whereby Bronowicz 
would plead and spend 18 to 36 months in prison.  Bronowicz 
again rejected the deal, but Officer Ollis ignored Bronowicz’s 
protests and told him that he did not need to appear before the 
judge in light of the plea agreement.   
 The revocation hearing was held with neither 
Bronowicz nor his attorney in the courtroom.  Officer Ollis 
presented the purported plea agreement to the judge, and 
Bronowicz was sentenced to 18 to 36 months’ incarceration 
pursuant to the alleged agreement.  Bronowicz maintains that 
he never waived his right to counsel, to appear before the 
court, or to have a plea agreement colloquy in open court and 
on the record.  No transcript of the January 2011 proceeding 
exists. 
E. Superior Court Appeal 
 Bronowicz then appealed his sentence to the 
Pennsylvania Superior Court, arguing, inter alia, that: (1) his 
due process rights were violated when his probation was 
revoked and he was re-sentenced in January 2011 in absentia, 
and (2) the sentence imposed was illegal for numerous 
reasons.  The Commonwealth filed an answering brief 
essentially admitting to all allegations.  Notably, the 
Commonwealth conceded that: (1) the January 2011 hearing 
revoking Bronowicz’s probation and imposing a new prison 
sentence was conducted in absentia, (2) there was no 
indication that Bronowicz had waived his right to be present, 
(3) Bronowicz had been re-sentenced for counts as to which 
no penalty was initially imposed, and (4) Bronowicz was 
subject to sentences that exceeded the statutory maximum.  
The Commonwealth ultimately concluded that “remand for a 
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new violation hearing and sentencing [was] required.” App. 
321.  
 In light of the Commonwealth’s concessions, the 
Superior Court issued a short order on January 13, 2012 (the 
“Superior Court’s order”) vacating the sentence imposed in 
January 2011 and remanding for further proceedings.  The 
order stated in relevant part: 
Although appellant now raises two challenges 
on appeal—one related to procedure and one 
related to the legality of the sentence—we need 
not address those challenges at this time, since 
the Commonwealth concedes that, due to an 
error committed at the time of sentencing, the 
current sentence must be vacated, and the case 
remanded to the trial court for a new sentencing 
hearing.  
Judgment of Sentence vacated.  Jurisdiction 
relinquished. 
App. 335-36.  On remand, the Court of Common Pleas 
ordered Bronowicz “paroled forthwith,” and released 
Bronowicz from custody on May 1, 2012.  App. 446. 
F. The Instant Suit 
 Bronowicz filed the present action in District Court 
against Allegheny County and Probation Officers Karen 
Ollis, Jeffrey Cima, Thomas McCaffrey, Director of the 
Allegheny County Probation Office, and Judge Donald E. 
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Machen, in both their individual and official capacities,9 
alleging numerous constitutional torts related to his unlawful 
incarceration.  
 Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint, arguing, 
inter alia, that Bronowicz’s § 1983 claims were barred by 
Heck v. Humphrey because he had not obtained a favorable 
termination of the state proceedings against him.  The District 
Court granted the motions, holding that the Superior Court 
order vacating Bronowicz’s January 2011 sentence was not a 
favorable termination within the meaning of Heck.10  Second, 
it held that Bronowicz’s claims against the probation officers 
in their official capacities were barred by sovereign 
immunity. 11  Bronowicz timely appealed.  
                                                          
 9 Bronowicz’s original and First Amended complaints 
include a host of other defendants, including the assistant 
district attorney and a former probation officer.  The District 
Court dismissed these defendants and Judge Machen from the 
action, and Bronowicz does not challenge their dismissal on 
appeal.  
 10 The District Court declined to exercise pendant 
jurisdiction over Bronowicz’s remaining state claims.  
 11 Bronowicz waived any argument to the contrary at 
oral argument, and we agree with the District Court that these 
claims are barred.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order to the extent it dismissed the claims against the 
Defendant Probation Officers in their official capacities.  See 
Kentucky. v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985) (a suit 
against a government official in his or her “official-capacity” 
is actually a suit against the entity itself); Haybarger v. 
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II.  Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 
1331; we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We review a district court’s dismissal order de novo.  
Weiss, 757 F.3d at 341.  “In doing so, we ‘accept all factual 
allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any 
reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be 
entitled to relief.’”  Id. (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 
515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
III.  Discussion 
A. Heck v. Humphrey 
 Bronowicz argues on appeal that the Superior Court 
order satisfies Heck’s favorable termination requirement and 
that the District Court erred in dismissing his § 1983 claims 
on this basis.   
 Under Heck,  
in order to recover damages for allegedly 
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, . . 
. a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 
conviction or sentence has been reversed on 
direct appeal, expunged by executive order, 
declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to 
                                                                                                                                  
Lawrence Cnty. Adult Prob. & Parole, 551 F.3d 193, 198 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (absent a waiver, suits against Pennsylvania’s 
probation departments are barred by sovereign immunity).  
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make such determination, or called into 
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ 
of habeas corpus.  
512 U.S. at 486-87.  Thus, the rule applies if “success in [the] 
action would necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of 
confinement or its duration.”  Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 
74, 82 (2005).  The foundation for Bronowicz’s claims rests 
on his allegations that he was improperly incarcerated for a 
total period of thirty months.  Because Bronowicz seeks 
damages for this “illegal” imprisonment, he must satisfy the 
favorable termination rule if his claims are to proceed.  See, 
e.g., Powell, 757 F.3d at 346 (plaintiff’s § 1983 claims 
stemming from his supervision on parole past his maximum 
sentence date must satisfy Heck’s favorable termination rule).  
 Bronowicz maintains that the Superior Court’s order 
vacating the January 2011 judgment satisfies Heck’s 
favorable termination rule.12  Appellees argue that the 
Superior Court’s order does not satisfy the Heck bar because 
the Superior Court vacated the sentence but expressly 
declined to address Bronowicz’s challenges to the legality of 
the sentence and proceedings—that is, the Superior Court 
                                                          
 12 Bronowicz argues in the alternative that Heck’s 
favorable termination rule should not apply here because he is 
no longer in custody and cannot pursue habeas relief, leaving 
him without a mechanism to satisfy the rule. We, however, 
conclusively rejected this argument in Gilles v. Davis, 427 
F.3d 197, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2005), where we held that a 
plaintiff who had never been incarcerated and who had no 
recourse under the habeas statute was nevertheless subject to 
Heck’s favorable termination rule.  
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never “declare[d] that it [was] an illegal sentence.”  
Allegheny Cnty. Br. at 12.  We think, however, that vacating 
a judgment as opposed to declaring it “illegal” is a distinction 
without a difference here because the Superior Court order 
plainly invalidated Bronowicz’s January 2011 sentence.  
B. Applying the Favorable Termination Requirement 
 The Supreme Court adopted the favorable termination 
rule in light of the “hoary principle that civil tort actions are 
not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of 
outstanding criminal judgments.”  Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.  
The purpose of the favorable termination requirement is to 
avoid “the possibility of the claimant [sic] succeeding in the 
tort action after having been convicted in the underlying 
criminal prosecution, in contravention of a strong judicial 
policy against the creation of two conflicting resolutions 
arising out of the same or identical transaction.” Id. at 484 
(quoting 8 S. Speiser, C. Krause, & A. Gans, American Law 
of Torts § 28.5, p. 24 (1991)); see also Kossler v. Crisanti, 
564 F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).13   
 Thus, Bronowicz must demonstrate that success on his 
§ 1983 claims would not conflict with the prior judicial 
resolution of his criminal proceedings.  Because success on 
Bronowicz’s claims arising from the January 2011 
                                                          
 13 The Supreme Court particularly wanted to guard 
against the possibility that a broad reading of § 1983 would 
permit collateral attack of outstanding criminal judgments in 
civil proceedings in contravention of Congress’ intent that 
prisoners first seek relief through state and federal habeas 
procedures.  Heck, 512 U.S. at 480-82. 
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proceedings would impugn only the validity of the judgment 
of sentence imposed on that date and not the validity of his 
underlying criminal convictions, he need not demonstrate that 
he was acquitted of the underlying criminal charges or 
succeeded in reversing those convictions.  Rather, he need 
only prove that the January 2011 proceedings were ultimately 
terminated in his favor. See, e.g., Powell, 757 F.3d at 346 
(§ 1983 claim for parole supervision past the maximum 
sentence date was not barred by Heck where the sentence—
but not the conviction—had already been invalidated by an 
appropriate state tribunal). 
 We have conducted our most salient favorable 
termination analysis in Kossler and Gilles, in the context of § 
1983 claims that, if successful, would demonstrate the 
invalidity of the plaintiffs’ criminal convictions.  See Kossler, 
564 F.3d 181 (excessive force, false arrest, and malicious 
prosecution claims); Gilles, 427 F.3d 197 (claim that arrest 
and conviction violated the First Amendment).  Accordingly, 
we required those plaintiffs to demonstrate that the outcomes 
of their prior criminal proceedings were indicative of their 
“innocence” of the crimes charged.  See Gilles, 427 F.3d at 
211-12; Kossler, 564 F.3d at 187 (“[A] prior criminal case 
must have been disposed of in a way that indicates the 
innocence of the accused in order to satisfy the favorable 
termination element.”).   
 Kossler and Gilles control our analysis here because 
they are demonstrative of our general approach to favorable 
termination analysis.  In those cases, we considered the 
“particular circumstances,” including relevant state law and 
the underlying facts of the case, in determining whether the 
“judgment as a whole . . . reflect[ed] the plaintiff’s 
innocence.” Kossler, 564 F.3d at 188 (internal quotation 
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marks omitted); see also Gilles, 427 F.3d at 211-12 (outcome 
of prior proceedings must be “consistent with innocence”) 
(emphasis added).  Thus, we have eschewed an overly 
mechanical approach that would categorically require a 
judgment to contain certain magic words in order to satisfy 
the favorable termination requirement.  Rather, we consider 
whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the 
prior proceedings reflect a favorable outcome for the plaintiff 
that would be consistent with the success of the plaintiff’s § 
1983 claims.    
 
 In Kossler, we considered whether a simultaneous 
conviction and acquittal on different counts arising from the 
same conduct constituted a favorable termination for the 
purpose of a subsequent § 1983 claim.  Kossler was charged 
with public intoxication, disorderly conduct, and aggravated 
assault after he was involved in a scuffle with a police officer 
outside of a bar.  Kossler was acquitted of aggravated assault 
and public intoxication, but convicted of disorderly conduct.  
He then sued the arresting officer for malicious prosecution 
under § 1983, arguing that Heck did not bar his claim because 
his acquittal on the aggravated assault charge constituted a 
favorable termination notwithstanding his conviction for 
disorderly conduct.  Kossler, 564 F.3d at 183-86. 
 We examined the relevant statutes and underlying 
conduct and determined that the criminal statutes involved all 
“aim[ed] at punishing the same underlying misconduct,” 
Kossler, 564 F.3d at 189 n.5, and that the charges in that case 
were “predicated on the same factual basis.”  Id. at 189.  We 
concluded that under those circumstances, “the judgment as a 
whole [did] not reflect plaintiff’s innocence,” id. at 188, 
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because the plaintiff was “clearly guilty of some wrongdoing 
. . . notwithstanding [the acquittal for aggravated assault].” Id. 
at 189.  Thus, the state proceeding “did not end in [the 
plaintiff’s] favor, even when we view[ed] the facts in the light 
most favorable to him.”  Id.   
 Similarly, in Gilles, we considered whether resolution 
of criminal charges through Pennsylvania’s Accelerated 
Disposition (“ARD”) Program constituted a favorable 
termination.  There, the plaintiff was arrested and charged 
with disorderly conduct after recording an inflammatory 
speech by a “campus evangelist” and refusing to leave at the 
direction of university police.  After entering an ARD 
program, the plaintiff filed a § 1983 lawsuit against officers 
and the university alleging First Amendment violations.  
Examining the relevant state statutes, we noted that ARD 
“imposes several burdens upon the criminal defendant not 
consistent with innocence, including a probationary term, 
‘restitution[,] . . . imposition of costs, . . . and such other 
conditions as may be agreed to by the parties.’”  Gilles, 427 
F.3d at 211 (quoting Pa. R. Crim. P. 316(a)).  We noted that 
probation in particular represented an “‘unfavorable’ period 
of judicially imposed limitations on freedom.” Id.  Thus, 
considering the circumstances, the disposition of plaintiff’s 
criminal charges through ARD did not constitute a favorable 
termination of charges, and success on his § 1983 claims 
would conflict with the result of his criminal proceedings.   
C. Bronowicz has Demonstrated Favorable Termination 
 Applying the same analysis here, and considering the 
Superior Court’s order in the context of the revocation 
proceedings as a whole, we conclude those proceedings were 
terminated in Bronowicz’s favor when the Superior Court 
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vacated the January 2011 judgment.  As required by Heck, the 
Superior Court is “a state tribunal authorized to [declare 
Bronowicz’s sentence invalid].”  See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-
87; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 742 (Pennsylvania law vests the 
Superior Court with jurisdiction over all appeals from final 
orders of the courts of common pleas).  The Superior Court, 
however, may only disturb a sentence imposed by a court of 
common pleas after a probation violation if the revocation 
proceedings themselves or the judgment of sentence was 
illegal.  See Commonwealth v. Coolbaugh, 770 A.2d 788, 792 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2001) (The Superior Court’s scope of review 
of a sentence imposed after the revocation of probation “‘is 
limited to the validity of the revocation proceedings and the 
legality of the judgment of sentence.’” (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Fish, 752 A.2d 921, 923 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000))).  Even though the Superior Court did not expressly 
address Bronowicz’s challenges to the legality of the sentence 
and revocation proceedings, the Superior Court’s order 
vacating the January 2011 judgment in light of the 
Commonwealth’s concession of “an error committed at the 
time of sentencing” is consistent with Bronowicz’s claim that 
the sentence imposed in January 2011 was invalid.   
 Unlike in Kossler and Gilles, the Superior Court order 
does not imply that the sentence imposed or the proceedings 
before the Court of Common Pleas in January 2011 were 
valid.   The Superior Court vacated the “Judgment of 
Sentence” in its entirety,14 and on remand, the Court of 
                                                          
 14 Appellees contend, and the District Court agreed, 
that the Superior Court’s order vacated only the sentence 
imposed in January 2011, not the revocation order.  
Accordingly, Bronowicz’s claims challenging the revocation 
of his probation and the legality of the January 2011 
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Common Pleas released Bronowicz from custody.15  App. 
336.  Neither the Superior Court order nor the subsequent 
                                                                                                                                  
revocation proceedings were dismissed as Heck-barred.  The 
Superior Court, however, vacated the “Judgment of 
Sentence,” and under Pennsylvania law, the vacatur of a 
judgment of sentence is effective not only to vacate the 
sentence imposed, but also the revocation of probation.  See, 
e.g., Commonwealth v. Barnett, 439 A.2d 182, 183 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1981) (appeal in which defendant sought review of 
merits of conviction should have been taken from judgment 
of sentence for probation violation rather than from denial of 
motion to vacate sentence); Commonwealth v. Wright, s116 
A.3d 133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2015) (vacating judgment of 
sentence where defendant was improperly sentenced for 
probation violations that took place after her probationary 
term had already expired).  The Superior Court vacated the 
January 2011 judgment of sentence, and while the order did 
not expressly conclude that the revocation of Bronowicz’s 
probation was improper, the order is not inconsistent with that 
conclusion.  
 15 In support of its conclusion that the Superior Court 
order vacated only the sentence imposed (and not the 
revocation of probation), the District Court asserts that 
following the vacatur, “a subsequent judgment was . . . 
entered by [the sentencing judge] which imposed a new 
sentence ordering [Bronowicz] paroled as of that date.”  App. 
31.  Bronowicz, however, alleges that he was released from 
incarceration and all supervision on May 1, 2012, and that no 
further sentence was imposed.  Appellant’s Br. at 24.  The 
May 1, 2012 order is ambiguous; it states only that 
Bronowicz was “paroled forthwith.” App. 446.  The order 
does not specify that a new term of probation is being 
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order issued by the Court of Common Pleas vacating 
Bronowicz’s sentence imposed any “unfavorable” conditions 
or burdens on Bronowicz that would be inconsistent with his 
claim that that the January 2011 judgment was imposed 
illegally.  
 Moreover, the purpose of the favorable termination 
rule is fully realized by this result because there is no risk that 
permitting Bronowicz’s § 1983 claims to proceed would lead 
to “two conflicting resolutions arising from the same 
transaction.”  Gilles, 427 F.3d at 209 (citing Heck, 512 U.S. at 
484).  Upon the imposition of the judgment of sentence in 
January 2011, Bronowicz did exactly what Heck requires—he 
appealed to a competent state tribunal which declared that 
judgment invalid.16   
                                                                                                                                  
imposed, and there was no probation order to continue at that 
time, as the January 2011 order assessed no further penalty at 
every count (excepting the sentence of incarceration that was 
vacated).  Given the ambiguity in the record and our 
obligation to accept Bronowicz’s factual allegations as true 
when reviewing an order granting a motion to dismiss, our 
analysis assumes that Bronowicz was completely released 
from custody on May 1, 2012.    
 16 Thus, Bronowicz’s § 1983 claims are not an attempt 
to end-run state review or federal habeas procedures.  See 
supra n.13.  In fact, there is no further action that Bronowicz 
could have taken to obtain a more express declaration that the 
judgment imposed was “illegal,” as he could not have 
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court or filed a federal 
habeas petition once he had achieved the desired result—
vacatur of the judgment of sentence.  It would be a bizarre 
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 Bronowicz’s claims stemming from the January 2011 
revocation proceedings and sentence do not constitute a 
collateral attack on his sentence because Bronowicz has 
already successfully challenged his sentence in state court.  
See, e.g., Powell, 757 F.3d at 346 (§ 1983 claim for parole 
supervision beyond the maximum sentence was not a 
collateral attack against sentence and was not barred by Heck 
where sentence had already been invalidated by an 
appropriate state tribunal).  Success on Bronowicz’s § 1983 
claims attacking the legality of the January 2011 proceedings 
would be fully consistent with the Superior Court’s order.  
Thus, the Superior Court’s order satisfies the favorable 
termination rule and fulfills its objectives. 
 We hold that Bronowicz’s § 1983 claims arising from 
the January 2011 proceedings before the Court of Common 
Pleas are not barred by Heck because Bronowicz has 
demonstrated that the judgment imposed was invalidated on 
appeal.  The District Court, however, properly dismissed 
Bronowicz’s remaining § 1983 claims, which, if successful, 
would impugn the validity of the July 2005 and July 2008 
revocation proceedings, as Bronowicz has not demonstrated 
that those proceedings were terminated in his favor.17  
                                                                                                                                  
result indeed to bar Bronowicz’s § 1983 claims—
notwithstanding the fact that a competent tribunal vacated his 
sentence—because the Commonwealth happened to admit to 
all of his allegations, obviating the need for thorough analysis 
by the tribunal. 
 17 The Superior Court order does not address the 
sentences imposed in July 2005 and July 2008.  Bronowicz 
never appealed these sentences.  Thus no court order 
 23 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons we will affirm in part and 
reverse in part the District Court’s order dismissing the 
Complaint.18  We remand to the District Court for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
invalidating them exists, as Bronowicz conceded at oral 
argument.  
 18 We do not consider Appellees’ alternative 
arguments for dismissal that were not passed on by the 
District Court.  
